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Struggle for Survival in a Capitalist State: 
Analysis of the Re-Profiling Program for a Russian Enterprise 
Masahiro Tokunaga 
This paper uses a case-study approach to examine the 
challenges facing a former state enterprise in order to sur-
vive in the new market economy of the 1990s. A cellulose 
and paper plant in Russia, Baikal'sk Cellulose and Paper 
Plant (BCPP), has been chosen for detailed analysis. To clari-
fy al stages of the survival process, this paper analyses a 
range of internal documents on the re-profiling program of 
this enterprise from 1987 to 2000. It concludes that econom-
ical and political factors, reflecting a world market driven by 
globalization, and accustomed prikhvatizatiia (grabbing) in 
the intra-regional political arena and between the center and 
periphery against a background of political devolution since 
the end of the Soviet era have contributed to a delay in 
restructuring. 
Keywords: transition economies, Russian enterprises, Baikal'sk 
Cellulose and Paper Plant (BCPP) 
Introduction 
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The transition countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union have experienced a mass of economic and social problems 
due to their inert, inefficient and deficit enterprises after the breakup 
of the planned economies in the 1990s. This paper describes the 
challenges faced by a former state enterprise in surviving in a com-
pletely different environment. A cellulose and paper plant in Russia, 
Baikal'sk Cellulose and Paper Plant (BCPP), has been chosen for 
detailed analysis. The plant has been accused of causing environ-
mental pollution over a long period, resulting in the then Soviet 
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Government deciding to close it at the end of the 1980s. However, it 
is even in operation in the same location. To make al the processes 
involved as transparent as possible, this paper analyses a range of 
internal documents on the re-profiling program of this enterprise 
from 1987 to 2000. 
Restructuring at issue: the re-profiling program for BCPP 
Environmental pollution caused by BCPP 
The pulp and paper industry in the Soviet Union was considered 
an important industry because its products were necessary to al 
sectors of society, the military, and the economy. However, it was 
also the major source of water pollution, which suggests that the 
damage caused was disproportionate to the size of the industry 
within the Soviet economy (Turnbull 1991, p.67}. Since the middle of 
the 1960s, the most significant struggle against water pollution in 
the Soviet Union has been the fight to protect Lake Baikal. Indeed, it 
seems that environmental awareness in the perestroika era stems 
from controversy over the lake's preservation. In the three distinct 
periods of "environmental awakening" in the postwar period, the 
first might be considered the "Baikal Awakening" or the "Baikal 
Problem" (Pryde 1991, pp.12-13 and 84-87)1. 
BCPP, situated on the south edge of Lake Baikal, is the main 
source of various pollutants entering the lake. Although there has 
been great controversy among scholars on whether BCPP activities 
have essentially altered the ecosystem of Lake Baikal, its existence 
was such a matter of concern that the Communist Party and the 
Soviet Government passed and updated a special resolution to pro-
tect Lake Baikal from identified sources of pollution including BCPP, 
while a commission was established to monitor the water quality of 
the lake. Although this paper does not examine controversy over the 
"Baikal Problem"2, it should be noted that the most decisive factor 
affecting the restructuring process of BCPP after transformation was 
the environmental pollution that it caused. In fact, the first step was 
the Gorbachev administration's decision to close BCPP and imple-
ment the re-profiling program discussed in detail below. This was so 
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the company could start anew. 
Perestroika of the "Baikal Problem": a final resolution? 
The re-profiling program for BCPP has its roots in the joint reso-
lution issued by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government 
on June 10, 1987, "On Measures to Ensure the Rational Utilization of 
the Water Resources of Lake Baikal between 1987-1995." It was 
issued prior to the epoch-making declaration of "green perestroika" 
on the whole country made via a joint resolution by both on January 
7, 1988, "On Essential Perestroika of Environment Protection in the 
Country," which announced large-scale changes associated with 
environmental policy. This first resolution to protect Lake Baikal 
showed detachment from the ineffective environmental policy of the 
previous years and aimed to establish new policy through the reor-
ganization of administrative organs. Because of its tendency toward 
radical reform, especially illustrated by the contentious project of re-
profiling BCPP (see Table 1), the contents were disputed. It was 
accepted by al people concerned, however, that these・events repre-
sent a historic change that would prepare for the next stage of the 
"Baikal Problem." Furthermore, since at the same time some high 
officials of related administrative ministries, including the prime 
minister, had been dismissed for not accomplishing the many tasks 
ordered by past resolutions to protect the natural environment 
around Lake Baikal, mainly those issued in 1969, 1971 and 1977 (The 
Current Digest of the Soviet Press 39: 19 (1987), pp.5-6), it was 
expected that the Soviet Government would take responsibility for 
resolving the long stalemate in the "Baikal Problem." 
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Table 1 Comparisons between the 1987 Resolution and Past Resolutions 
Shared Points of View 
Restriction of business activities 
-Any other expansion and new building of 
enterprises is prohibited except when permis-
sion is given by the USSR Council of Ministers. 
Strengthening of environmental measures by 
enterprises 
-Installation and renewal of pollution abate-
ment equipment, further development of tech-
nologies for recycling, etc. 
Restriction of shipping in the basin of Lake 
Baikal 
-Prohibition of shipping during spawning time 
of omul'(Lake Baikal native fish), prohibition of 
rafting logs downstream, changes in shipping, 
etc. 
Strengthening of forest protection policies 
around Lake Baikal 
-Tree cutting rules defined more strictly, reor-
ganization of forest management authorities, 
increase in personnel and equipment for pre-
venting fire, etc. 
Enhancement of control over business activities 
by the regional communist parties and govern-
ments 
-For the protection and rational use of natural 
resources in the Lake Baikal basin, each of the 
regional committees of the Communist Party, 
the republic cabinet of Buryat ACCP, and the 
oblast'executive committees of Irkutsk Oblast' 
and Chita Oblast', should enhance their control 
over the business activities of the enterprises in 
their own territories while giving al sorts of 
assistance to them. 
The role of the USSR People's Control 
Committee 
-The USSR People's Control Committee should 
systemically monitor the administrative activi-
ties related to these resolutions and submit a 
report to the USSR Council of Ministries every 
year. 
Different Points of View 
Past environmental policies highly criticized 
-A statement was made that the main cause of 
the "Baikal Problem" was the delay or failure of 
the administration in performing the duties 
under past resolutions, which lay in an irrespon-
sible attitude. 
Adoption of zoning methods 
-Zoning for water protection areas where the 
rules and regulations of business activities are 
made especially for each zone. 
Construction of a pipeline for discharges from 
BCPP 
-In order to halt the discharge of effluents into 
Lake Baikal and divert them into the lrkut River, 
construct a new pipeline from BCPP to the river. 
[ Re-profiling program for BCPP 
-Halt cellulose production at BCPP (transfer its 
production capacity to other plants in Ust'-
lllimsk) and change it into a furniture-manufac-
turing plant. 
Development of Tourism 
-Promote building facilities and infrastructures 
for tourism and recreation. 
Development of natural gas resources 
[ Establishment of a inter-ministry committee 
-As a sub-organization of the State Hydro-
Meteorological Committee, Goskomgidromet, 
establish an inter-ministry committee, which is 
responsible for evaluating the fulfillment of 
environmental policies in the Lake Baikal basin, 
controlling business activities, and monitoring 
ecological conditions. 
(Source) The Soviet Government resolutions or joint resolutions with the Communist Party in 1969, 
1971, 1977 and 1987 on the protection of the Lake Baikal basin 
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Table 1 summarizes the principal features of the 1987 resolution 
compared with previous resolutions to preserve the Lake Baikal 
basin. Although several measures are the same, for example 
restraining industrial activities and intensive ecological regulations, 
the most significant difference is the declaration to close the cellu-
lose and paper sectors of BCPP and implement a re-profiling pro-
gram by 1993. This suggests that past environmental measures 
taken by BCPP were rejected because of their ineffectiveness; these 
measures were set up by the socialist system to support its progres-
siveness in environmental policy and its predominance over the cap-
italist system. The establishment of a new inter-ministry committee 
also seems to reflect the intention toward radical reform in environ-
mental policy on the whole. 
Documents even more radical than the 1987 reso1ution were 
placed in the hands of the RSFSR ministries the following year, and 
later, Moscow organized hearings on its own initiative to confirm 
various statements, opinions and demands in respect to the social 
and ecological aspects of the "Baikal Problem" (Kontseptsiia 
Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskogo Razvitiia…1999, p.35). This ekologizat-
siia (excluding less ecological activities) movement crystallized into 
a regional environmental protection program entitled "A 
Comprehensive Territorial Environmental Protection Plan for the 
Baikal Basin," worked out by the State Urban Planning Institute of 
the RSFSR, Gosstroi, with the participation of the Academy of 
Sciences of the USSR and other scientific and planning organiza-
tions. The USSR Council of Ministers approved it in 1990 as an 
antecedent program to al others for the long-term implementation 
of a unified state policy in nature management. It aimed to identify 
individual territorial units characterized by particular features of the 
natural environment and economic activities, and establish an 
appropriate regime to harmonize the use of nature and the perform-
ance of economic activities. It was striking that the ekologizatsiia of 
the regional economy structure also prioritized development in the 
Baikal basin for the agro-industrial sector, machine-building, recre-
ational complexes, etc., which would meet regional demand and 
lead to a hike in the living standards of local residents (Vorob'yev 
1989, pp.33-48). Therefore, the 1990 program required not only envi-
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ronmental policy reform, but also the reexamination of regional eco-
nomic development strategy to realize the raw-material supply base 
that had been a prime cause of the continuing environmental deteri-
oration around the Lake Baikal basin. Thus, perestroika was a his-
toric turning point in the "Baikal Problem" regarding institutional 
change. 
Straying re-profiling program: the loss of state control and sponta-
neous privatization 
After the 1987 resolution, the State Design Institute for the cellu-
lose and paper industries in Siberia, Sibgiprobum, prepared to re-
profile BCPP with the completion of six plans in 1990. These alterna-
tives were characterized by unbleached cellulose production, the 
total amount of capital investment and the term of redemption, the 
estimated profit margin and other items (Sukhodolov 1995, pp.69-
77). By the end of perestroika, however, the development of capital-
ism in Soviet society seemed much clearer for the citizens and al six 
plans based on a centrally planned economy lacked a market analy-
sis of product channels and demand and supply changes, and were 
nothing more than "pie in the sky" initiatives. 
When the economic and political results of perestroika resulted in 
the break-up of this huge country, the Institute of Limnology (IL) of 
the Siberian Branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which led 
the ecological protection movement for Lake Baikal an_d opposed 
BCPP operations for many years, took the lead in business affairs for 
the re-profiling program for BCPP3. As the federal government had 
done in the preceding 1987 resolution, the republic government initi-
ated its own decision-making process in a similar manner through 
two official resolutions in May 1987 and March 1990. Although it 
also approved the abolition of cellulose production and saw the 
necessity for a re-profiling program, it pursued a plan for "going its 
own way." At this time, the IL was concerned with a feasibility study 
on making the ultra-pure deep water of Lake Baikal into bottled min-
eral water, and soft and alcohol beverages, and obtaining financial 
support from foreign companies4. Thus, the RSFSR Government set 
forth a plan to proceed with the re-profiling program of BCPP and 
ordered the Siberian Branch to allocate two million rubles to the IL 
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for the project (RSFSR Government Order No.149-r on December 16, 
1991)5. This approach at a sub-national level was apparently differ-
ent from the Soviet Government approach embodied in the 1987 
resolution that required BCPP to change into a furniture-manufactur-
ing plant (see Table 1). This suggests the loss of state control and de 
facto spontaneous privatization, in other words, the beginning of the 
enclosure of state enterprises by vested interests and newcomers, 
and can thus be called "the melting and independence process of 
the state sector" that prevailed in the entire country in the last years 
of perestroika (Mizobata 1996, pp.179-185). 
As mentioned above, the ekologizatsiia in the "Baikal Problem" 
was not only an arena for regional political power that was confront-
ed with central political power, but also provided opportunities to 
reconfigure interest groups in regional society, especially in relation 
to the point of whether to go ahead with further development or to 
prioritize to environmental problems when justification for economic 
development in the Soviet Union was in doubt. As the locality of 
environmental destruction was focused on by the "green perestroi-
ka" movement, support for the construction of a raw-material sup-
ply base through socialistic modernization was rejected. This led to 
both conflict of opinion on the economic development strategy 
between central and regional governments, and stimulation of 
regional interest groups to seek a new development goal that chal-
lenged the legitimacy of the Soviet Government. This process, as 
discussed in detail in the following sections, became clear and more 
intense due to the unification and subdivision of economic interests. 
I The re-profiling program for BCPP in the new Russia 
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Russian Government 
decided to implement the BCPP re-profiling program again in 
December 1992, based on publicly collected proposals to convert 
BCPP into "an ecologically secured production unit"6. Here, we need 
to pay attention to the role of Irkutsk Oblast'in this program. Since it 
was clearly defined that any program would necessitate the Irkutsk 
Government's consent, preparation of the re-profiling program was 
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strongly influenced by regional authorities, which facilitated a bot-
tom-up style, amassing agreements with interested groups includ-
ing BCPP and reporting the results to the federal government. 
Compared with the previous decree by the RSFSR Government in 
December 1991 that specified the production of bottled water, and 
soft and alcohol beverages as an object of re-profiling program and 
ordered the Irkutsk Government to draft a submission to the superi-
or government, this new program clearly enhanced regional power. 
In the light of the weakened central power structure and non-sys-
tematic devolvement from the end of perestroika, the balance of 
power over BCPP and its re-profiling program changed dramatically, 
moving two steps away from the Soviet administrative organs to the 
Irkutsk Oblast'Government via the federal authorities (RSFSR or RF). 
Hence, it follows that the regional government took the initiative in 
advancing the re-profiling program of BCPP, as did other Russian 
regions aiming to enclose their own territorial resources during this 
period. 
1997 re-profiling program: "Re-profiling of BCPP and the Solution to 
Social Problems in Baikal'sk" 
The BCPP's administration offered to remodel the plant based on 
the 1987 resolution with the exception of extending cellulose pro-
duction a further five years until 1998. This was highly criticized by 
environmental groups because it would allow BCPP to release vari-
ous polluting compounds into the Lake Baikal basin (Baikal Currents 
May 1995, p.11). Although the Irkutsk Government approved this 
plan, it was not finally realized due to the lack of financial resources, 
and the alternative plan to produce mineral water, etc. had repeated-
ly been articulated in・public by the IL, for instance, at the NATO-
sponsored seminar held in Ulan-Ude on September 12-17, 1994 (see 
Note 5). The next re-profiling program was put in place in 199互
However, by this time, plans for extended cellulose production until 
2010 and the foundation of a building materials production sector in 
addition to timber and furniture products had dramatically modified 
the contents of the 1987 resolution. Although the Irkutsk 
Government also approved this program, the Baikal Commission, an 
inter-ministerial federal agency established in 1992 to regulate vari-
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ous official activities for promoting sustainable development in the 
Baikal region (Russian Government resolution No. 992 on December 
18, 1992), required its reexamination and thus, new plans were 
required7. In 1996-1997 and onwards, while international organiza-
tions were more concerned with the conservation of Lake Baikal and 
BCPP's future with its re-profiling program到thedomestic scene was 
mired in the president's struggle with the parliamentary federal law, 
"On the Conservation of Lake Baikal." This marked the height of the 
confrontation during this period釘
Figure 1 Production and Sales of Cord Cellulose at the Beginning of the 1990s 
Cord Cellulose (43.7%) 
Log→ I BCPP 
Cord Cellulose (56.3%)↓ Cord Fiber (about half) 
I Textile Plant in Belarus II ニニ:~こ0ndRubber Goods Plant in Russia I 
Ot~ae~~:」:::ば心~~~~rs ↓ ↓ 
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＂＂"•一 To Krasnoyarsk 
Car Tire 
(Source) Configured based on Samarukha and Sukhodolov 1992, p.43. 
Rubber Goods 
Under these circumstances, the IL became the virtual supervisor 
of the 1997 re-profiling program with its director, M. A. Grachev, 
appointed its top manager. A decision was then made to withdraw 
the previous plan, having litle prospect of success, to establish a 
bottling plant. The following overall new plan was prepared: main-
tain cellulose production until 2002, introduce the most up-to-date 
industrial technology to produce wood pulp called "bleached ther-
mo mechanical pulp," belenaia khimiko-termomekhanicheskaia 
massa, from which ecologically clean paper (this was asserted 
repeatedly) could be made. Although the essence of the new plan 
was to abolish cellulose production gradually and shift to the pro-
duction of more environmentally friendly paper products, it was 
severely criticized by environmental groups who had been in long-
term alliance with the IL because of the unfavorable influence that 
BCPP's restructuring had on the basin, (Zelenyi Mir No.24 1998, p.4). 
72 
BCPP's simplified model of cellulose production consisted of the 
mechanical and chemical processing of raw wood (mainly conifers), 
boiling or cooking, washing and screening, and bleaching and dry-
ing, through which the plant received various products used as raw 
materials for finished goods (synthetic fibers, etc.) at another loca-
tion (High-Level Advisory Services… 1996a, pp.9-17). This meant 
that BCPP remained at the stage of manufacturing semi-products as 
shown in Figure 1, but there was an earnest wish that BCPP extend 
its production profile to certain finished goods with higher added 
value. By switching the whole production process from cellulose to 
paper production, the 1997 re-profiling program tried to realize its 
wish by making high-valued paper products from bleached thermo 
mechanical pulp produced by BCPP itself and different kinds of pulp 
purchased from other plants (see Figure 2). Although the program 
should have implemented environmental policy as a so-called in-
process technology, a very successful method in Japan after the oil 
shock10, the IL, at the core of this program, no longer looked to be a 
guardian of Lake Baikal in cooperation with environmental groups, 
but was an insider who would benefit from keeping BCPP in opera-
tion through its re-profiling program11. 
Figure 2 Outline of the 1997 Re-Profiling Program 
Log→ Bleached Thermo Mechanical Pulp ↓ / Pulpfrom Other Plants 
About 1,900 
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from Existing Printing Paper 
Cellulose • Wrapping Paper 
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A又.Baikal'sk Government / ． . . ．．．．． ． . ． . ....? ?
? ?
?
?
About 1,000 Employees 
Hired from Existing 
Subsidiary Sectors (about 
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Subsidiary Sectors I·····~ (Transport, etc.) + . : . ~ : Separated from BCCP as an Individual Company 
(Source) Configured based on Federal'naia Tselevaia Progrc;1mma…1997, pp.24-33. 
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F I rom env1ronmenta measures to an investment strategy 
According to the resolution passed by the Baikal Commission 
general meeting held in March 1996 (see Note 7), a working group 
headed by the President of the Siberian Branch of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, V. A. Koptyug, was founded. This working 
group conducted a comparative examination of the prospective pro-
posals submitted so far to refine the re-profiling program. The work-
ing group reported that BCPP had no future unless it was renovated 
as a paper production plant and, as a result, it was decided that the 
1997 re-profiling program be completed within this framework. 
Given this direction, in August 1996, a change to the partial self-pro-
curement of cellulose that would serve as the prime material for var-
ious paper products was made so that BCPP would not be complete-
ly dependent on cellulose from the outside12. However, since it was 
essential to stop existing cellulose production to advance the re-pro-
filing program, bleached thermo mechanical pulp was put forward 
as a substitute for normal cellulose. After the sudden death of 
Koptyug, Grachev rose to the top of the ladder and begun to strong-
ly encourage this plan. 
In January 1997, the Baikal Commission accepted the re-profiling 
program centering on the production of bleached thermo mechani-
cal pulp on the condition that it should change the defective 
drainage equipment plan. It also demanded the establishment of an 
international executing agency that would technologically complete 
the program, and submit it to the Ecological Expertise, 
Ekologicheskaya Ekspertiza, in a defined way (Gosudarstvennyi 
Komitet RF… 1998, pp.159-160). Its establishment was finally 
approved by the Irkutsk Oblast'first vice-governor decree No.26-rz 
on January 20, 1997, whose members were fifteen specialists from 
BCPP (4 members), Sibgiprobum (6 members), CH2M Hil (U.S. busi-
ness consultant company) and USAID (3 members), and the IL (2 
members), with Grachev assuming the chair (Federal'naia Tselevaia 
Program ma…1997, p.4). 
In the first half of 1997, public hearings on the re-profiling pro-
gram for BCPP were held in various places to reach agreement 
through an exchange of views with residents and environmental 
groups. At the same time, a number of administrative bodies and 
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research institutions were requested to examine and evaluate the 
program's contents from an expert viewpoint. Relevant official let-
ters in Irkutsk give the impression that academic organizations in 
Siberia tried to extend their sphere of influence over the re-profiling 
program by advocating their own plans or technology sales. In con-
trast, most administrative bodies supported the program without 
reservation. The total expenditure of six hundred million dollars 
shown in the plan was undoubtedly attractive to most research insti-
tutions as a way of surviving competition among each other. It 
seems, therefore, that the rise of the IL and its conversion to a BCPP 
insider stimulated other institutions to take part in the rent-seeking 
process to become concessionaires13, although al were concerned 
about continuing cellulose production. 
These facts lead to the conclusion that the re-profiling program 
had changed significantly; the initial purpose of re-profiling the busi-
ness activities of BCPP to prevent environmental pollution of Lake 
Baikal retreated into the background, while modernization of the 
plant was put forward on the premise that BCPP could act as it had 
in the past. That some of the words of the draft title, "Considering 
the Prevention of Anthropological Influences on Lake Baikal" were 
ultimately deleted also suggests that the re-profiling program was 
changing from an environmental policy into an investment strategy. 
Because BCPP was managing with obsolete equipment14, it was 
understandable that the re-profiling program would be regarded as 
a great, and final, chance to resuscitate BCPP by revamping the 
machinery and equipment in the near future. Naturally, this drew the 
attention of environmentalists, who furiously repelled offers of com,-
promise and resisted the re-profiling program. 
Issues of the 1997 re-profiling program: proponents versus the envi-
ronmentalists15 
There was argument over the 1997 re-profiling program; propo-
nents consisting of BCPP, governmental bodies, academic institu-
tions and Baikal'sk citizens insisted on modernizing BCPP, while 
environmental groups including some officials and scientists, resis-
ted a gradual transition to paper production in the program, 
although not al appealed for the immediate closure of BCPP. The 
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issues raised repeatedly by the environmentalists can be summa-
rized as follows: a) keeping cellulose production, in particular, the 
boiling process, operative until 2002, b) no guarantee of the produc-
tion of bleached thermo mechanical pulp being harmless, c) the 
occurrence of hazard substances, in particular dioxins and mercury, 
d) the unreliable source of financing, e) inconsistency with the exist-
ing statute, and f) lack of comparative analysis of alternatives (an 
indispensable screening procedure defined by law). On the other 
hand, proponents criticized these points mainly because of achieve-
ments related to b) both at home and abroad, and a lack of under-
standing of the issue as if an entirely new, experimental plant would 
be placed adjacent to Lake Baikal. They also criticized the oppo-
nents'unscientific discussion of c); it was chemically impossible for 
these compounds to occur at BCPP. As ford), a revised plan was pre-
sented in which roughly forty percent of the total expenses would be 
covered by self-financing (depreciation and amortization as well as 
cash injection from net profit), and the rest by a non-interest govern-
ment loan and public financing. In addition, proponents insisted that 
there was no viable alternative to the draft they submitted, so they 
tried to forcibly solve the problem of f) which was concerned with 
issue e). Although some proponents doubted the wisdom of a), it 
was considered necessary to obtain the money for implementing the 
re-profiling program. 
The gulf between the two groups was so wide that there was no 
sign of compromise. While there was a range of views on the supply 
side of the re-profiling program, what did the Baikal'sk citizens 
understand by these proposals? As noted in Figure 2, if this program 
had been carried out as planned, it would have meant that approxi-
・mately 1,900 employees producing cellulose would be re-engaged in 
producing bleached thermo mechanical pulp and other paper-relat-
ed products. On the other hand, 1,350 people from the subsidiary 
sectors would be made redundant, among which roughly 1,000 
employees would have been absorbed in the same sectors but in 
newly established companies separated from BCPP. The Baikal'sk 
Government would have provided jobs for the rest (about 350 
employees). The citizens reacted in the following way16: they first 
requested that the re-profiling program be implemented immediate-
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ly; next, they insisted on a key industry in Baikal'sk; and finally, they 
rebuffed another proposal by the environmentalists to close BCPP 
and develop small and medium-sized enterprises. This suggests that 
their deepest concern was to secure employment. 
Another problem with the 1997 re-profiling program was the 
reconstruction of the community's lifeline infrastructure. This pro-
gram included renewing some power-supplying facilities (electricity 
and heat) and the water and sewage system; these were to be sepa-
rated from BCPP and operate independently. Although this separa-
tion would inevitably raise costs sharply, which threw doubt on the 
feasibility of the program, closing BCPP without considering social 
infrastructure reform would mean untreated sewage flowing into 
Lake Baikal, which inconsistent with the re-profiling program, i.e. 
mitigating, and eradicating completely in the future, the environ-
mental pollution of Lake Baikal (Sukhodolov 1996, pp.210-214). 
As mentioned above, it turned out that the re-profiling program 
of BCPP changed local interests, with the result that BCPP has tried 
to stay alive with stakeholders including those who were once 
unfriendly involving themselves in the process, first of al, the Irkutsk 
Oblast'Government and the IL. Furthermore, the whole experience 
over the decade indicates that enterprise restructuring frequently 
opens the way for community restructuring. In other words, enter-
prise reforms are not only an aspect of business management 
changes that dominate the literature on the economics of post-com-
munist transformations, but also lead to the reorganization of com-
munities through economic and physical redeployment, the latter 
being as heavy a burden on enterprise restructuring as the former, 
especially in the case of Russian industrial location structure. 
Il 2000 re-profiling program: "Re-profiling of BCPP and the General 
Program of the Socio-economic Development of Baikal'sk" 
The 1997 re-profiling program, which completed public hearings, 
Was sent to the Ecological Expertise according to federal law 
No.174-FZ "On Ecological Expertise." If it had been approved there, 
it would have been sent to the Expert Soviet attached to the Russian 
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Federal Government, Ekspertnyi Sovet pri Pravitel'stve RF, and put 
into effect as a specific federal program after formal recognition. At 
the Ecological Expertise stage, however, this program was turned 
down because it did not observe the existing nature protection 
statutes, lacking consideration of the environment and inadequately 
examining socio-economic circumstances in Baikal'sk. In other 
words, focusing on the social responsibility of enterprises, there was 
concern about the influence of the re-profiling program on the com-
munity as well as the natural environment. Thus, it was returned for 
reconsideration at the regional level. 
Sophistication of the 1997 re-profiling program 
Considering the results of this assessment, while the Baikal 
Commission required further revision of the program from the 
Irkutsk Oblast'Government and BCPP, it was proposed to the federal 
government that the Ministry of the Economy and the State 
Committee for Environmental Protection be commissioned to 
enforce a contest that would decide the re-profiling program 
(Gosudarstvennyi Komitet RF…1999, pp.196) 17. The basic proce-
dures of the 2000 re-profiling program were similar to those of the 
1997 version. Under Irkutsk Oblast'Government resolutions No.210-
122 on November 30, 1998 and No.71-p on February 3, 1999, an exe-
cuting agency was again established in which four working groups 
in the social, technological, ecological and economical fields aimed 
to refine the program with an advisory council evaluating its con-
tents18. At that time, the head of the division covering regional 
economies and social problems in the Irkutsk Scientific Center of SB 
RAS, I. I. Dumova, who was also secretary of the academic coordina-
tion council attached to the Irkutsk Oblast'Government, was select-
ed as leader of the 2000 re-profiling program. 
Since there was a focus on the environmental pollution of Lake 
Baikal; natural scientists had long taken the initiative on the BCPP re-
profiling program. By this time, however, the parties concerned, 
except for a hard-line group voicing its closure, cooperated in advo-
cating a re-profiling program that centered on paper production. It 
was therefore a greater problem to overcome the inadequate analy-
sis of social and economic aspects in the program. These circum-
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stances may have significantly contributed to the selection of 
Dumova who had a degree in economics researching environmental 
management in the Lake Baikal region (see Dumova 1996). 
Therefore, the 2000 re-profiling program did not propose a particu-
larly new plan, but stressed the examination of four amended drafts 
that varied concerning the pros and cons of cellulose production, the 
materials and methods to be used, and a products profile 
(Kontseptsiia Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskogo Razvitiia…2000). In addi-
tion, an opinion poll for Baikal'sk citizens was also conducted to pre-
dict the influence on the community of the re-profiling program. 
In choosing members for the working groups and advisory coun-
cil, and referring to the contents of the program, lobbying activities 
were just as prevalent as for the 1997 re-profiling program. These 
activities included introducing or recommending candidates, pro-
moting various technologies and proposing the adoption of each 
organization's own plans. After the whole of 1999 was spent on 
obtaining agreement through an exchange of opinions between 
government authorities and various organizations, the bodies con-
cerned accepted the draft at the beginning of 2000. The Irkutsk 
Oblast'Government consented to send it to Moscow, and it was at 
the deliberation stage at federal government level as of February 
2001 (Nauka v Sibiri No.3 2001, p.10). 
Issues of the 2000 re-profiling program: disrupted by the forty-nine 
percent state holding stocks of BCPP 
As the 2000 re-profiling program was considered necessary to 
secure the efficiency and coherence of the 1997 re-profiling pro-
gram, the main point at issue, whether the economy or the environ-
ment should be given priority, was added to the discussions on 
financial and practical affairs, focusing on establishing concrete pro-
cedures to advance the re-profiling program effectively after 
approval by the federal authorities. In this context, a proposal to 
work out funding for the re-profiling program by using the profits 
from the sale of the state-holdings in BCPP was reasserted固 This
recalled some privatization problems that have troubled Russian 
economic reforms in the 1990s. The 2000 re-profiling program draft 
submitted in July 1999 suggests that there was conflict concerning 
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the treatment of state holding stocks, which delayed adopting a new 
program (Predlozheniia po Razrabotke…1999, pp.13-14). 
The privatization problems of BCPP involved in the re-profiling 
program since 1987 provoked a fight for leadership between central 
and regional governments. The Irkutsk Oblast'Council, who dis-
cussed the program from March to April 1992, required the immedi-
ate implementation of the re-profiling program in which local inter-
ests would be considered thoroughly. The council also requested 
that privatization not be brought into effect until completion of the 
program20. While the re-profiling program did not progress in effect, 
however, the State Committee of Assets, Goskomimushchestva, 
approved a privatization scheme by decree No.934 on November 27, 
1992, to reorganize BCPP as an open joint-stock company via the so-
called second option where employees were given priority in pur-
chasing the majority of the capital stock (common stocks up to a 
fifty-one-percent share). Once there was liquidity of ownership, and 
only 3.6% was left for the employees of BCPP, the state became the 
largest stockholder, holding 49% of the total stocks. The rest was 
shared by three corporations, Yuceltrading, Elwood, and lrkutskii 
Registr21. Therefore, we first turn our attention to the traces of this 
49% state holdings, which caused problems in the 2000 re-profiling 
program, by following the documents and official letters of various 
organizations, in particular those of the Ministry of State Property 
(Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennogo lmushchestva, referred to below as 
the MSP)22. 
As a registered owner of the 49% state holding stocks of BCPP, 
the Irkutsk Fund Agency, lrkutskoe Fondovoe Agentstvo, managed 
these holdings, consisting of common stocks (20%) and preference 
stocks (29%), for the personal account of the MSP祖 Thesewould be 
auctioned to obtain the necessary funds to implement the re-profil-
ing program on the condition that a predetermined investment pro-
gram would be executed in line with a defined procedure. The MSP, 
concerned with losing its influence over BCPP as a stockholder if this 
auction went ahead, gave the order to transfer the 49% state holding 
stocks to the MSP itself on the pretext of checking the contents of 
the capital stock holdings, including the cultural, educational and 
sports facilities used for public and welfare purposes (decree 
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No.14/199 on December 9, 1998) that remained with BCPP as a lega-
cy of its socialist heritage. Yet, this was so unacceptable to the 
Irkutsk Fund Agency that it did not make the appropriate change in 
the register. Therefore, the MSP decided to sue for execution of the 
decree in an arbitration court in the region24. Before the delibera-
tions, however, the agency conceded that the MSP should become 
the owner of the 49% state holding stocks. In addition, the MSP 
wanted to convert the preference stocks into common stocks with 
voting rights (decree No.562-r on April 19, 1999). However, since the 
BCPP itself was opposed to the series of measures that the MSP had 
taken, it did not change the list of stockholders and refused to give 
voting rights for these stocks. The Irkutsk Oblast'Committee for the 
Management of State Assets, Komitet po Upravleniyu 
Gosudarstvennym lmushchestvom lrkutskoi Oblasti, which was the 
regional organ of the MSPi also submitted a petition to the court of 
arbitration in the region to call off the general meeting of stockhold-
ers scheduled for April 23, 1999. An appeal by the MSP was support-
ed once again, with the result that it was forbidden to hold general 
meetings of stockholders before June 20, 1999, by a writ of execu-
tion from the court (No.5114 on April 20, 1999). BCPP was forced to 
accept this drder the following day, and in the end, it was deter-
mined that the next general meeting of stockholders would be held 
on June 25, 199925. After this, the MSP cooperated with other federal 
governmental agencies, and made another demand to add represen-
tatives from the MSP itself, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of 
Finance and the State Committee for Environmental Protection to 
the board of directors of BCPP to take part in the 2000 re-profiling 
program as joint drafters26. 
It is apparent that the federal governmental agencies tried to play 
a more intensive role in the management of BCPP and increase their 
influence on the re-profiling program by strengthening control of the 
49% state holding stocks. It is hardly surprising that this also led to 
considerable dissatisfaction on the part of BCPP, whose board had 
expressed discontent over the federal agencies'decision in a letter 
to the then Irkutsk Oblast'governor, N. V. Eroshenko, noting that a 
transfer of these stocks to the MSP would not only deprive other 
stockholders of investment opportunities, but also make solving the 
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re-profiling problem difficult and reduce the influence of the regional 
government on BCPP. Because the Irkutsk Oblast'Government had 
fallen in line with BCPP, Governor Eroshenko, who attended a meet-
ing held at the Ministry of Economy on these issues, said, "the cur-
rent position of the MSP does not seem to objectively reflect the cor-
responding roles of the board of kombinat [BCPP] and the Irkutsk 
Oblast'Government. "27 
In relation to these procedures, we can clarify some obscurities 
by analyzing documents of the Committee for Economic Policies, 
Komitet po Ekonomicheskoi Politike, of the State Duma, which 
examined the legitimacy of the two decrees that allowed the 49% 
state holding stocks to be transferred to the MSP and then converted 
into common stocks28. The following were the problems pointed out 
as being inconsistent with the existing statute. 
● Determining whether to change a property's position with state 
holdings is acceptable only when reorganizing a firm as a joint-
stock company, or for those engaged in the production of speci-
fied strategic commodities. 
● Since the law defines the Russian Federal Property Fund as the 
owner of state holding stocks, neither this fund nor the MSP is 
qualified to order a transfer of property in these stocks. 
● Converting preference stocks into common stocks is acceptable 
only when the Russian Federal Property Fund has to release 
these stocks onto the market according to a previously approved 
privatization plan. In this case, preference stocks should be 
changed into common stocks immediately as well as automati-
cally. 
● To realize the plan of MSP, it is essential to modify or add items to 
the articles of association of BCPP; this can be done only at gen-
eral meetings of stockholders. 
Based on these legislative and juridical interpretations, the 
Committee for Economic Policies concluded that the decision of the 
MSP meant de facto refusal to sell the 49% state holding stocks, 
which would deprive the BCPP of possibilities of implementing the 
re-profiling program祖
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On the other hand, the MSP with its diametrically opposite opin-
ions insisted on its legitimacy in a letter addressed to the above-
mentioned committee and some corporate stockholders of BCPP, 
rejecting their calls. Considering the above-mentioned criticisms, we 
can identify the points at issue as follows30. 
● Since the Russian Federation public prosecutor's head office had 
charged that BCPP was not obligated to the orders to remove 
public utilities and other welfare facilities from its capital, it was 
judged that the privatization process was not yet completed, 
which made the MSP capable of reinforcing their ownership of 
the 49% state holding stocks. 
● The Russian Federal Property Fund was not the sole owner of 
these stocks. Because they have been moved to this fund tem-
porarily in preparation for an auction, it was also legally allow-
able to transfer them to the MSP. 
● Although it was defined that the Russian Federal Property Fund 
was the sole owner of the preference stocks, these regulations 
had reasonably lost their validity at the time of the order to trans-
fer these stocks to the MSP. Thus, to convert preference stocks 
into common stocks did not seem illegal. 
● Therefore, common stocks with voting rights were now in place 
for the 49% state holding stocks, making the federal government 
capable of _making a stockholder's claim against any re-profiling 
program at the general meeting of stockholders. 
As a further step toward enhancing its appeal through state hold-
ing stocks, the MSP decided to bring up another plan to add BCPP to 
a list of companies that were forbidden to sell their state holding 
stocks before a fixed date, whose products and services were essen-
tial to national security interests (the Russian Federation govern-
ment resolution No. 784 on July 17, 1998)31. This proposal was 
approved by the Russian Federation Government decree No.2166-r 
on December 31, 1999, in which the following steps were undertak-
en to this end. First, BCPP was added to the above list to strengthen 
the position of the 48.99% held by the state. Second, as for those 
state holding stocks exceeding this, the MSP and the Russian 
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Federal Property Fund would organize an auction according to the 
appropriate procedure. Third, the MSP could change any privatiza-
tion programs for BCPP and make them reflect state interests 
through proposals to the federal government that had been previ-
ously agreed upon with the Ministry of Economy and the Irkutsk 
Oblast'Government. 
After economic transformation, the re-profiling program for BCPP 
led to intra-regional confrontation that was not settled within the 
framework of political conflict between the federal authorities and 
federate entities. Since the 1997 re-profiling program intensified its 
tone as an investment plan assuming that BCPP would be preserved 
as a paper mill, its proponents have been locked in an antagonistic 
confrontation with its opponents. But this time, the point at issue 
has changed greatly, and not only the contents of the program, but 
also the treatment of the 49% state holding stocks as its likely finan-
cial source, have topped the agenda, with the result that the privati-
zation problems of BCPP have resumed, shedding a bad light on a 
potentially awkward relationship with Moscow. To then Prime 
Minister Putin, who had signed government decree No.2166-r denot-
ing that the federal authorities were firmly committed to a change in 
the privatization plan as well as participation on the management 
board, the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
said, "this decree brings al efforts for agreement over the years to 
naught, …the re-profiling program for BCPP is in fact meant to be 
rejected," expressing their regret over federal government interven-
tion32. Here, the center-periphery relationship has been (re)activated 
in the restructuring process of BCPP, because its re-profiling pro-
gram is closely aligned with the perspective of privatization. The 
2000 re-profiling program is going up and down with the swell 
caused by three layers of interests: the state (the federal govern-
ment, especially the MSP), a federal entity (the Irkutsk Oblast' 
Government) and the enterprise (BCPP). They are al groping for a 
method of corporate governance whilst seized by the privatization 
controversy, namely, fighting to take the initiative in the re-profiling 
program. 
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Conclusion 
The case study of the restructuring projects for BCPP concludes 
that economical and political factors, — articulation to the world 
market driven by globalization (Tokunaga 2003), and accustomed 
prikhvatizatiia (grabbing) in the intra-regional political arena and 
between the center and periphery against a background of political 
devolution since the end of the Soviet era —have contributed to a 
delay in restructuring. Although in Russia there are not many cases 
of liquidating unprofitable companies and removing al the workers, 
we should not overlook that the criterion for scrapping and building 
of enterprises has been changing: much more economic rationality 
but less social responsibility. 
(Associate Professor of Transition Economics) 
Notes 
1 According to Pryde, the second and third periods may be termed the "Chernobyl 
Awakening" and the "Perestroika Awakening" respectively. 
2 Among numerous articles on the pollution problem of Lake Baikal, those most 
useful for us are Goldman (1972), Komarov (1980), International Union for… 
(1991), and Tulokhonov (1996). 
3 This institute fought against air and water pollutions in the basin as shown by 
the following articles by the former director, G. I. Galazii who was in office from 
1954 to 1987. See Galazii (or Galaziy) (1980), (1981), (1991) etc. 
4 As one of the leading partners, an affiliated company of a regional bank in 
Japan had successfully advanced the project and trademarked the mineral water 
products in Russia. However, it became known that these products would not go 
on sale in Japan as they lacked an indispensable condition of mineral water: the 
original water must be taken from the source, but Lake Baikal is formed by many 
inflow rivers and does not have its own source. In addition, there was a differ-
ence of opinion on business strategy on the Russian side, and the Japanese 
partner finally decided to retreat from the project (interview by the author in 
1999). 
5 The IL seemed to want to partially shift the abolished production capacity of the 
cellulose to the Selenginsk Cellulose and Cardboard Plant located on the eastern 
side of Lake Baikal in the Republic of Buryatia. The IL called it "castling," i.e. an 
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exchange of various regional resources. See in detail Grachev et al. (1996). 
6 Vegor Gaidar, the then vice-Prime Minister, seemed to declare the invalidity of 
the 1987 resolution before this resolution by the Russian Government, No.925 
on December 2, 1992, "On Re-profiling Baikal'sk Cellulose and Paper Plant and 
Making Compensation for the Loss of Cellulose Production," yet this statement 
has not been officially confirmed. 
7 Calling for more allowance for the results of environmental assessments and 
existing governmental resolutions, the Baikal Commission demanded the estab-
lishment of a working group that would scrutinize the drafts of the re-profiling 
programs submitted by the various groups (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet RF… 
1997, pp.159-160). 
8 For example, UNESCO had specified five items of request to the Russian 
Government and those concerned with the management of Lake Baikal in its 
official information on the inscription of Lake Baikal on the world heritage list on 
January 20, 1997. These included ensuring the passage of the federal law on 
Lake Baikal in the State Duma and implementing the conversion of BCPP to 
eliminate it as a pollution source. See in detail Dobretsov (1999, pp.9-12). 
9 Though the bil passed in the State Duma and the Council of Federation in the 
middle of 1997, President El'tsin refused to sign it for the reason that it would 
not be consistent with existing statutes. The organization for environmental pro-
tection of the Duma took vengeance on him by calling for a criminal prosecution 
of BCPP not to implement the re-profiling program and appealed to the General 
Prosecutor to put the case to trial (Zelenyi Mir No.22 1998, pp.2, 7-8 and No.4 
1999, pp.6-7). After negotiations lasting almost two years, they reached a com-
promise and agreed to the modified version of "On the Conservation of Lake 
Baikal" that has been effective since May 1999. 
10 Nakanishi (1994, pp.52-57) shows the re-profiling of products and the change of 
raw materials in the Japanese cellulose and paper industry contributed to a 58% 
reduction of Chemical Oxygen Demands (COD) discharged between 1970-1989. 
On the other hand, the improvement of the discharge system through end-of-
pipe technology brought only a 16% reduction during the same years. However, 
the fact that the American cellulose and paper industry has developed an end-
of-pipe technology and succeeded in a further decrease of COD discharge in 
some areas suggests that the technology that is of more relevance depends on 
various prevailing conditions. 
11 The objective factors that served to change IL's position on the "Baikal Problem" 
were the ongoing improvement in the environmental indices of BCPP achieved 
after the end of 1980s (Sukhodolov 1995, pp.26-27) and worldwide technological 
innovations made in the cellulose and paper industry in 1990s (High-Level 
Advisory Services…1996b, pp.9-10). 
12 Words of Grachev at a public hearing on the re-profiling program in April 1997 
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(see Note 15 below). 
13 We have to bear in mind that the re-profiling program as of 1997 was planned to 
run as a specific federal program partly financed by the federal budget. 
14 On the enhanced risk of obsolescence of BCPP due to litle capital spending, see 
in detail Sibirskii Ekologicheskii Vestnik 1996, No.3-4 (http://www.nsu.ru/commu-
nity/nature/booksNest_3-4/index.htm). 
15 This section is based on the following minutes of two public hearings, except for 
a few notes: Stenogramma Publichnykh Slushanii po Proektu "Federal'noi 
Tselevoi Programmy Pereprofilirovaniia Baikal'skogo Tselliulozno-Bumazhnogo 
Kombinata i Reshenie Sviazannykh s Etim Sotsial'nykh Problem g. Baikal'ska" 
Irkutsk, April 3, 1997 and Protoko/ Sobraniia Predstaviterei Obshchestvennykh 
Organizatsii i Grazhdan g. Baikal'ska i Sliudianskogo Raiona po Obsuzhdeniiu 
Proekta "Federal'noi Tse/evoi Programmy Pereprofilirovaniia Baikal'skogo 
Tselliulozno-Bumazhnogo Kombinata i Reshenie Sviazannykh s Etim 
Sotsial'nykh Problem g. Baikal'ska" Baikal'sk, April 29, 1997 in Materialy 
Sog/asovaniia .. (1997). 
16 My summary of some of the words said at the public hearing. 
17 Thus far the contest for the re-profiling program of BCPP has not been conduct-
ed, though it was clearly defined in a 1992 government resolution (see Note 6). 
18 Protoko/ Soveshchaniia u Zamestitelia Glavy Administratsii Berezutskogo Ju. A. 
po Voprosy "Razrabotka Kontseptsii Razvitiia g. Baikal'ska i Pereprofilirovaniia 
BTsBK" No. 1-3. Irkutsk, 12, 19 and 26 May, 1999 in Materialy Soglasovaniia .. 
(2000). 
19 Although this idea was seen in the early stage of discussion concerning the re-
profiling program, it seemed to have been rejected in 1997, because there was a 
possibility of procuring finance from the federal government budget as a special 
federal program solely to support BCPP and the community (Kontseptsiia 
Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskogo Razvitiia .. 1999, p.10). 
20 See, for example, the decisions of the Irkutsk Oblast'Council on March 26, 1992 
and on April 29, 1992. 
21 As of March 1996, it was Sibatominvest, Siblec and lrkutskmebel'that were con-
nected with BCPP as its main corporate stockholders (Inter Baikal Vestnik. 
Irkutsk, May 1996, p.12 and Kontseptsiia Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskogo 
Razvitiia .. 1999, p.12). 
22 It was reorganized from the State Committee for the Management of State 
Property and again changed to the Ministry of Property Relations. 
23 The Irkutsk Fund Agency is one of the regional organs of the Russian Federal 
Property Fund, Rossiiskii Fond Federal'nogo lmushchestva. As the actual seller 
of state assets and stockholder with speaking rights for the stocks kept under its 
control, municipal, regional and federal agencies managed the sale of properties 
allocated to each governmental level. However, the fund has often been in con-
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flict with the MSP who is responsible for overall development of the privatiza-
tion program in Russia. 
24 Because the demand made by the MSP for the transfer of stocks was ignored 
(official letter of the MSP on November 17, 1999 in Materialy Soglasovaniia… 
(2000)), it seemed to take a firm stance against the agency. 
25 Official letter of the MSP on April 28, 1999 in Materialy Sog/asovaniia .. (2000). 
26 Official letter of the Committee for Industry, Construction, Transport and Energy 
of the State Duma on June 2, 1999 and official letter of the MSP on June 8, 1999 
in Materialy Sog/asovaniia…(2000). 
27 Protocol of the meeting held in the Ministry of Economy on June 19, 1999 in 
Materia/y Soglasovaniia…(2000). 
28 Not al the State Duma was against the MSP. Some organizations, such as the 
Committee for Industry, Construction, Transport and Energy, supported the 
decision of the MSP. 
29 Refer to the questionnaire from the deputy director of the Committee for 
Economic Policies on June 16, 1999 and its internal documents to examine the 
letter from the MSP on June 18, 1999 in Materialy Soglasovaniia…(2000). 
30 Official letters of the MSP on June 3, 1999 and on June 18, 1999 in Materialy 
Soglasovaniia…(2000). 
31 Official letters of the MSP on June 18, 1999 in Materialy Soglasovaniia…(2000). 
32 Official letters of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences on 
January 26, 2000 in Materia/y Sog/asovaniia .. (2000). 
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